Did the Iraq Sanctions Work?

With a new CIA report virtually confirming that WMDs have not been - and probably never will be - found in Iraq, it is worth re-examining not just the justifications used for the Iraq War, but also the justifications and political pressures that imposed a decade of crippling sanctions before the invasion. The sanctions were imposed by the United Nations, largely at the behest of the United States, in the aftermath of Gulf War I. As one might expect from a well-entrenched dictator, Saddam made a great show of pretending that the sanctions were not hurting him, cracking down on domestic dissenters while simultaneously taunting the United Nations Security Council. Within a short time, many were saying that the sanctions were not working.

Years later, as the world decried a humanitarian crisis of starving children and neglected hospitals, Bush and his "intelligence" people were claiming that the sanctions had not worked because Saddam was actually increasing his arsenal and developing even more dangerous weapons, not to mention forging links with terrorists. These claims seemed to be supported by aerial photos from satellites and spy drones. We now know that Sadddam was bluffing big time - he had the old enemy, Iran, waiting across the border, the US ready to topple him and even elements of his own people would have leapt at the first signs of weakness. So he set up strange constructions in the desert, moved trucks with mysterious canvas covers from one side of the country to the other and generally kept his enemies guessing.

So the question that is worth asking now is this: did the sanctions actually work? In contrast with what Bush and his "intelligence" folks told us before and during the war, it now seems that Saddam really was significantly weakened by the sanctions and even by the subsequent UN weapons inspections. His soldiers were demoralised, he lacked the money or the opportunities to purchase new weapons and he was forced to abandon - or at least shelve indefinitely - his WMD programs. So in the military sense at least, the sanctions did work. Unfortunately, they also had the consequence of inflicting poverty on the vast majority of innnocent Iraqis.

Was it worth it, then? As far as disarming a dangerous regime, the sanctions worked better than a military invasion might have done at the time. As far as minimising civilian casualties, the sanctions created harships which steadily worsened over the years and ultimately were comparable with a full-scale military attack. The Food For Oil program was a worthwhile initiative but it did not seriously alleviate the Iraqi people's suffering. In this sense, then, the sanctions failed. But if the Food For Oil program could have functioned more effectively, and if Western "intelligence" could have been a little less incompetent and/or politically unbalanced, the results could well have been very different indeed. If Saddam's enemies - his neighbours, his people and his own military in particular - had known how weakened he really was, there is little chance that he would still have been in power when George W. Bush came looking for his oil reserves.

What does it matter? Next time the UN debates the removal of a brutal dictator, sanctions will again be a major option. The UN does not have an effective military arm and the US is only prepared to use force in situations where it sees an economic benefit. If the sanctions process can be improved to the point where it can guarantee results, sooner or later, the world will have a more effective non-military tool to help relieve oppression around the planet. While they ultimately failed - or were usurped by military invasion - the Iraq sanctions should be remembered for the lessons they can teach us.