When Did Bush Decide To Invade Iraq?

Now that Bush and Blair have publicly poo-poohed the Downing Street Memo, claiming they did not make up their minds to go to war until the very last minute, the challenge for us anti-war critics is to prove them wrong.

Of course, one might have assumed that there was already enough solid proof in the Downing Street Memo itself, which says:

Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record...

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

... It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin...

Reading this carefully, it is clear that the section of text stating that "no decisions had been taken" is only referring to the timing of the assault, not the larger question of whether or not to attack. Indeed, the meeting which the memo describes is all about how the US and UK were going to justify the invasion, not whether or not it would happen:

... the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force...

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors... If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

... on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN...

The Defence Secretary... cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Among the memo's conclusions:

The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

In other words, the "political strategy" of pursuing a UN ultimatum was only ever intended to assist with the legal justification and public support for an invasion which had already been decided upon. And the USA was not even interested in this UN ultimatum, it was the Brits who were pushing for it. And Bush is singled out as a person who rabidly wanted to go after Saddam, so much so that Blair would need to have a quiet word with him and "set out the political context".

So it seems to me that the Memo itself is a lot more convincing than Bush and Blair would have us believe.

But OK, just for the sake of argument... what else have we got?

Well, what about those millions of anti-war protestors who demonstrated around the world before the invasion, demanding that UN weapons inspectors be given more time? They sure didn't think that war was inevitable (nor did they all believe that Saddam had WMDs, even though we are repeatedly told that "everybody" thought so).

What about the UN itself, who steadfastly refused to endorse another Security Council ultimatum to Saddam? Remember, folks, UN Weapons Inspectors were forced to flee Iraq just days before the bombing started, after the US and Britain repeatedly claimed that they were being totally ineffective. We now know they were 100% effective and there really were no WMDs in the country.

What about people like former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill, who sat in on a National Security Council (NSC) on Jan. 30, 2001, at which the president made it clear that toppling Saddam Hussein sat atop his to-do list.

O'Neil was taken aback that there was no discussion of why it was necessary to "take out" Saddam. Rather, after CIA Director George Tenet showed a grainy photo of a building in Iraq that he said might be involved in producing chemical or biological agents, the discussion proceeded immediately to which Iraqi targets might be best to bomb. Again, neither O'Neil nor the other participants asked the obvious questions. Another NSC meeting two days later included planning for dividing up Iraq's oil wealth.

What about former NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark, who told Tim Russert on 'Meet the Press':

' I got a call on 9/11. I was on CNN, and I got a call at my home saying, "You got to say this is connected. This is state-sponsored terrorism. This has to be connected to Saddam Hussein." I said, "But-I'm willing to say it but what's your evidence?" And I never got any evidence.'

Who did that?

'Well, it came from the White House, it came from people around the White House.'

What about comments by Paul Wolfowitz, who admitted that on the weekend following 9/11 the discussion in the White House was about which country to attack first - Afghanistan or Iraq?

What about the neo-conservative's dirty little Office Of Special Plans? What was the purpose of this secretive group, if not to hand-pick intelligence on Iraq and massage it into a case for war?

What about all the lies we were told, like the Niger uranium, the weather balloon trucks, the aluminium tubes? What about Powell's totally discredited presentation ot the UN? If no decision had been made to attack, why was there a need to generate all these lies? Who was responsibile for them and what was their agenda?

What about intelligence insiders who resigned in disgust because they felt intelligence was being manipulated in favour of war?

What about John Bolton orchestrating the firing of a UN diplomat who was trying to send a chemical weapons team to Iraq?

In a March 2002 "white paper," Bolton's office said Bustani was seeking an "inappropriate role" in Iraq, and the matter should be left to the U.N. Security Council - where Washington has a veto.

So that was happening even before the Downing Street meeting. And Bolton had been threatening Bustani since June 2001. And the UK eventually helped the USA get Bustani busted out of business (it was later ruled an unlawful dismissal).

What about Bush's former ghost writer, Mickey Herskowitz, who says presidential candidate George W. Bush was already talking privately about the political benefits of attacking Iraq way back in 1999!

And what about the words of Bush himself, who once said:

"God told me to strike at al Qaida and I struck them, and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which I did."

Well, George, when exactly did God tell you to invade Iraq? Was it before or after the Downing Street meeting on July 23, 2002? Because I assume that would be when you really made up your mind, right?

I guess this CNN/Time report from May 6, 2002, gives us a clue as to when the Big Guy spoke to you:

Two months ago [March 2002, again before the Memo], a group of Republican and Democratic Senators went to the White House to meet with Condoleezza Rice, the President's National Security Adviser. Bush was not scheduled to attend but poked his head in anyway--and soon turned the discussion to Iraq. The President has strong feelings about Saddam Hussein...and did not try to hide them. He showed little interest in debating what to do about Saddam. Instead, he became notably animated, according to one person in the room, used a vulgar epithet to refer to Saddam and concluded with four words that left no one in doubt about Bush's intentions: "We're taking him out."

Sounds like somebody had made his mind up, doesn't it?

And then there's this from the same report:

Dick Cheney carried the same message to Capitol Hill in late March. The Vice President dropped by a Senate Republican policy lunch soon after his 10-day tour of the Middle East--the one meant to drum up support for a U.S. military strike against Iraq. As everyone in the room well knew, his mission had been thrown off course by the Israeli-Palestinian crisis. But Cheney hadn't lost focus. Before he spoke, he said no one should repeat what he said, and Senators and staff members promptly put down their pens and pencils. Then he gave them some surprising news. The question was no longer if the U.S. would attack Iraq, he said. The only question was when.